@misc{16150,
  keywords = {Key recovery, Somewhat homomorphic encryption, GSW, Statistical attack},
  author = {Prastudy Fauzi and Martha Hovd and H{\r a}vard Raddum and Tillich J.H.},
  title = {A Practical Adaptive Key Recovery Attack on the LGM (GSW-like) Cryptosystem},
  abstract = {We present an adaptive key recovery attack on the leveled homomorphic encryption scheme suggested by Li, Galbraith and Ma (Provsec 2016), which itself is a modification of the GSW cryptosystem designed to resist key recovery attacks by using a different linear combination of secret keys for each decryption. We were able to efficiently recover the secret key for a realistic choice of parameters using a statistical attack. In particular, this means that the Li, Galbraith and Ma strategy does not prevent adaptive key recovery attacks.},
  year = {2021},
  journal = {International Conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography},
  volume = {12841},
  pages = {483-498},
  month = {07/2021},
  publisher = {Springer},
  isbn = {978-3-030-81292-8},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-81293-5_25},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81293-5_25},
}